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COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS

For the last several years, many federal court watchers, myself included, have been advocating for a congressional commission to study
the courts of appeals that would make recommendations for needed
reform legislation.
* Thomas E. Baker holds the James Madison Chair in Constitutional Law and serves as
the Director of the Constitutional Resource Center at Drake University Law School, Des
Moines, Iowa; thomas.baker@drake.edu. At the invitation of the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Professor Baker participated in a research
conference with Commission members and staff in March 1998. The views expressed here,
however, are the author's alone. This article was published electronically in February 1999.

THE FEDERAL COURTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1

The 105th Congress created the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals and gave it the statutory
charge to perform the following functions by the end of 1998:
(i) study the present division of the United States into the several judicial
circuits;
(ii) study the structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals
system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit; and (iii) report to
the President and the Congress its recommendations for such changes in
circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious
and effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals,
consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process.1
The Commission was created out of a compromise between those
in Congress who wanted to divide the Ninth Circuit and those who did
not. Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed the members: Retired Supreme
Court Justice Byron White (Chair); Judge Gilbert S. Merritt from the
Sixth Circuit; Judge Pamela Ann Rymer from the Ninth Circuit; Judge
William D. Browning from the District of Arizona; and N. Lee Cooper,
past President of the ABA.
The Commission reviewed the many previous studies. It also developed additional statistical data with the Federal Judicial Center and
the Administrative Office of United States Courts and collected further
information directly from the courts of appeals. The Commission consulted numerous court experts and conducted independent surveys of
federal judges and lawyers who practice before the federal courts. Six
public hearings were held between March and May of 1998 in Atlanta,
Dallas, Chicago, New York, Seattle, and San Francisco. Nearly onehundred written statements were filed by interested parties in addition
to the testimony at the public hearings.
The Commission published a draft report on October 7, 1998, inviting written comments by November 6, 1998. It received nearly
eighty written comments on the draft report and made some important
changes. The final report was delivered to the President and the Congress, with a copy to the Chief Justice, on December 18, 1998.
The final report, along with the earlier draft report and all submitted comments, together with all the testimonies at the public hearings
and other supporting documents, are available on the Commission's
2
web site.
1.

2.
PEALS,

28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000).
COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF

http://app.comm.uscourts.gov.

AP-
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In this article I will summarize the final report. I will also include a
few of my own editorial comments.
II.

PROBLEMS OF GROWTH

The problems of the United States Courts of Appeals have been
and continue to be problems of growth. Beginning in the 1960s, those
courts experienced unprecedented growth in their dockets-more and
more appeals. Congress created judgeships to close the gap between
demand and supply for appellate decision making. But more and more
appeals keep coming and projections for the future are rather Malthusian. Some court experts are predicting that if docket growth does continue at recent rates the courts of appeals will be overwhelmed.
Anyone who remembers doing long-division at a grade school
chalkboard, understands that doing math in public is usually boring and
sometimes embarrassing. But to understand the problems of growth,
3
we must appreciate some general statistical trends.
Between 1960 and 1990-over those thirty years-the number of
federal appeals multiplied by ten times, from about 4,000 to about
40,000. Today the number of annual filings is over 50,000 (53,777 in
1997).
This docket growth has led to the creation of new circuit judgeships-more and more judges. In 1950, there were sixty-five circuit
judgeships. Today there are 167 circuit judgeships on the regional
courts of appeals.
Every so often, Congress has divided circuits when their caseloads
and their benches got too big. The Tenth Circuit was carved out of the
Eighth Circuit in 1929. The Eleventh Circuit was divided from the old
Fifth Circuit in 1981. But that is about all Congress has been willing to
do-add judges and divide circuits.
Over the same time period, the change in the nature of appeals has
been just as important as the change in the number of appeals. The
important point to understand is that the criminal portion of the docket
has grown the most. Criminal-related appeals-direct criminal appeals,
prisoners' civil appeals, and habeas corpus appeals-today account for
about half the docket (51%), which is about twice the proportion it was
back in 1960 (24%).
3. For more detailed statistics, see Administrative Office of U.S. Courts Homepage,
http://uscourts.gov; see also Federal Judicial Center Homepage, http://fjc.gov.
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The change in the nature of appeals partly accounts for the fact
that the courts of appeals have been able to cope with much larger
caseloads in recent years without a commensurate increase in judgeships, simply because those appeals take relatively less judge time. The
number of judgeships has increased only about two-and-one-half times
to deal with a caseload that has multiplied by a factor of ten times over
the same period. In 1950, there were thirty-six filings per judgeship; in
1997 there were three hundred-plus filings per judgeship.
Over the last thirty or more years, the circuit judges have responded to explosive docket growth in two ways: by employing more
staff and by developing differentiated decisional procedures. But solutions have a way of developing into problems. They have side effects.
And the intramural judicial reforms-what the judges and courts did to
add staff and to modify traditional appellate procedures-have created
new, different problems for the court system.
Not that long ago, each circuit judge had only one law clerk in
chambers. Today most active judges employ three clerks and in some
circuits some judges have four elbow clerks. Along with this staff increase in chambers, circuits began to employ central staff attorneys in
numbers roughly equal to the number of judgeships on the court, so
that the judges have large numbers of "in house counsel" working on
appeals.
So-called "differentiated decisional procedures" began in the 1960s
and 1970s. Something of a siege mentality developed then in the biggest
circuits with the biggest caseloads. Today these procedural shortcuts are
the norm and everyone takes them for granted, judges and lawyers
alike. The underlying rationale of all these so-called reforms is to reduce the time and attention judges give to some categories of appeals,
thus allowing judges to decide more and more appeals.
The two most significant procedural shortcuts are the nonargument calendar and the unpublished opinion. Appeals are screened by
panels of judges and then decided on the briefs without any oral argument. Some appeals are decided on the merits without a published
opinion. Either a brief unpublished opinion disposes of the appeal or in
some appeals there is no opinion whatsoever and the case is simply
"affirmed without opinion." Still other appeals are diverted into courtadministered settlement programs, designed to resolve the dispute
without any further judge involvement.
The national figures for merits decisions are worrisome to anyone
who is concerned with due process and procedural values, and the
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trend lines indicate that things are getting worse. Consider these nationwide figures: three out of five appeals (60%) are decided without
an oral argument, and three out of four appeals (77%) are decided
without a published opinion. So much for the federal appellate tradition that prevailed until this generation.
Perceptions do vary. Some observers and most judges insist that
the courts of appeals are in pretty good shape. However, many observers and some judges have voiced serious concerns about workload
problems and their impact on the federal appellate courts. Indeed, the
law review commentary is full of pessimistic assessments and sounds of
alarm. Here is a representative list of perceived problems and expressed concerns:
(1) Intra-circuit conflicts: different three-judge panels in the same circuit
apply the law differently. If the law is a prediction of what the judges will
do-to paraphrase Justice Holmes-then the law of the circuit has become unpredictable because panels can find circuit precedents to rule either way in many appeals.
(2) Inter-circuit conflicts: there are too many important inconsistencies
among the circuits on specific issues of federal law. The national law is
becoming regional and developing more variations than we have time
zones.
(3) Inadequate appellate capacity: there are too few judges deciding too
many appeals to give them the attention the cases deserve, and things will
only get worse.
(4) Truncated appellate procedures: the procedural shortcuts have degraded federal appellate justice. We have gotten too far away from the
Learned Hand era when every appeal was fully briefed, orally argued, and
decided collegially by a three-judge panel with a published opinion.
(5) Inappropriate staff influence: judges rely on in-chambers law clerks
and central staff attorneys too much and unduly delegate the judicial function. "Law clerk justice" has become prevalent and acceptable as a necessary evil.
(6) Undue appellate delays in some appeals: unreasonable delay in the
decision of some individual appeals results in hardships to particular litigants and a general decrease in finality in the system.
(7) Unreasonable costs and delays in the system: the current appellate
procedures are simply not adequate. The system is not performing efficiently in the run of cases. The rate of appeals is too high and there are
too many frivolous appeals clogging the system.
(8) Diseconomies of scale: the large number of appeals being decided by
large numbers of judges by the regional courts of appeals result in diseconomies of scale-especially in the larger circuits like the Ninth Circuit-for example, a worsening loss of collegiality among judges, higher
court administrative costs, and generally more expensive appellate justice
for lawyers and litigants.
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Then Chief Judge Howard T. Markey of the Federal Circuit complained ten years ago about the "before" and "after" effects of caseload
and procedural compromises which have moved the federal appellate
system away from a judicial model of measured justice towards a bureaucratic model of case processing:
As performed as recently as [now thirty] years ago, the personally conducted federal appellate process comprised: (1) review of the record and
briefs by the judge; (2) oral argument of thirty or forty-five minutes on a
side; (3) preparation by the judge of a written opinion; (4) assistance in
each chamber by one elbow law clerk and one secretary; and (5) frequent
and adequate conferences of the judges on the cases.
As performed today, the bureaucratically conducted federal appellate process comprises: (1) screening and track-setting by staff attorneys;
(2) review of records and briefs by a law clerk or a staff attorney; (3) oral
argument in less than one third of the cases, and then for fifteen or twenty
minutes a side; (4) preparation of opinions by law clerks and staff attorneys; (5) dispositions without opinions in two-thirds of the cases; (6) assistance in each chamber by three law clerks and two secretaries and
assistance to all chambers by a corps of staff
attorneys; and (7) infrequent,
4
short judicial conferences on the cases.
In the last ten years, things have gotten worse. What is most worrisome is that the experts and insiders seem to be becoming more pessimistic that the familiar solutions are not keeping ahead of the growing
problems. "'Crisis' is a much overused word. Burgeoning caseloads
are nothing new, nor is the sense that the system is on the verge of
breakdown," insists Professor Arthur Hellman, one of the most knowledgeable and informed federal courts experts, but he goes on to worry,
"What is new is the perception that the traditional remedies-enlarging
the number of judgeships and auxiliary staff, creating new courts, or
subdividing existing courts into smaller units-are no longer
adequate.'5
III.

WHETHER TO DIVIDE THE NINTH CIRCUIT

The Commission on Structural Alternatives was specifically
charged with making recommendations about the Ninth Circuit. It did
not recommend that Congress split the Ninth Circuit, however. In4.
Howard T. Markey, On the Present Deteriorationof the Federal Appellate Process:
Never Another Learned Hand, 33 S.D. L. REV. 371, 376-77 (1988).
5.

ARTHUR

D.

HELLMAN, THE CRISIS IN THE CIRCUITS AND THE INNOVATIONS OF THE

BROWNING YEARS, IN RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE-THE INNOVATIONS

OF THE NINTH CIR-

CUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 1, 4 (Arthur D. Hellman, ed., 1990) (foot-

notes omitted).
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stead, the Commission recommended legislation authorizing the Ninth
Circuit to reorganize itself into three regionally-based divisions.
The Commission's primary position is that dividing the Ninth Circuit now would be counter-productive, that splitting the circuit is both
impractical and unnecessary. Furthermore, the Commission believes
that there are some good administrative reasons to preserve the Ninth
Circuit intact. At least for now, I agree with the Commission and so
those arguments will not be rehearsed again here, except to note that
the Commission emphasized the importance of having a single body of
federal decisional law in common across the western states and the Pacific seaboard.
Merely for the sake of completeness, the Commission did review
the pros and cons of three very different realignment options, without
endorsing any of them except to say that each of them is flawed. The
Commission went on to say that the dozen or so other approaches bandied about in the literature are without any merit whatsoever. The
"classical split option" would create a new Ninth Circuit including Arizona, California and Nevada, and a new Twelfth Circuit including
Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Northern Mariana Islands,
Oregon, and Washington. The "realignment option" would shift Arizona to the Tenth Circuit: the new Ninth Circuit would include California, Guam, Hawaii, Nevada, and Northern Marianas Islands; the new
Tenth Circuit would include Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming; the new Twelfth Circuit would include
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington. The "California
split option" would create a new Ninth Circuit including Districts of
Arizona, Southern and Central California, Guam, Hawaii, Nevada, and
Northern Mariana Islands and a new Twelfth Circuit including Districts
of Alaska, Eastern and Northern California, Idaho, Montana, Oregon,
and Eastern and Western Washington.
In my view, only the so-called "classical split option" will be viable
in the Congress. To shift Arizona to the Tenth Circuit would be to disrupt two circuits and would draw opposition from the bench and bar in
Arizona and in the States of the Tenth Circuit. The idea of subdividing
California between two different circuits surely would be too much for
the bench and the bar in California to accept. Any proposal must have
the support of the bench and the bar to have any chance of enactment.
Therefore, the second and third realignment options discussed in the
final report should be declared "D.O.A."
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I do want to go on record here to endorse the Commission's principled opposition to those in Congress, mostly Senators from the Northwestern states, who have been pushing for a division of the Ninth
Circuit because they disapprove of particular decisions of the court or
individual judges of the circuit. This would amount to judiciary gerrymandering and we should condemn it in no uncertain terms. There are
good reasons and bad reasons to restructure the federal court system;
there are sound policy reasons to divide circuits and to reassign states
to different circuits, for example. But to pass off as "reforms" proposals that really have the purpose or intent to disapprove of some judges
or some decisions-in order to manipulate the law of the circuit to coincide with some Senators' political preferences-should not be understood to be a congressional prerogative. It does violence to the
separation of powers and the independence of the Third Branch. The
proper way to change judicial interpretations of a particular federal
statute is to enact legislation amending the statute. The proper way to
affect the judicial philosophy of a federal bench is through exercise of
the President's nomination power and the Senate's advice and consent
authority.
IV.

STRUCTURAL OPTIONS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS

What is more interesting for federal court watchers and more important for the bench and the bar beyond the Ninth Circuit is that the
Commission went on to recommend that Congress authorize all the
other courts of appeals to reorganize themselves along divisional lines.
The Commission also recommended that two-judge panels decide at
least some appeals and went on to develop and recommend the entirely
new idea of district court appellate panels.
A.

Reorganizing the Courts of Appeals into Divisions

In a move that is sure to be as controversial as it is original and
interesting, the Commission invented an entirely new way to deal with
problems of more and more appeals and more and more judges in the
courts of appeals. The Commission drafted a proposed statute to
amend 28 U.S.C. § 46 to authorize any court of appeal with more than
fifteen judgeships to organize itself into adjudicative divisions. 6 This
proposal would immediately apply to three of the regional courts of
6.

Appendix C to the final report contains the proposed general statute, see http://app.

comm.uscourts.gov.
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appeals: the Fourth Circuit (fifteen judges), the Fifth Circuit (seventeen
judges), and the Sixth Circuit (sixteen judges). More importantly, it
would portend the future of the rest of the courts of appeals as the
growing appellate caseload increases pressure on Congress to create
additional circuit judgeships.
According to the Commission, the particular details of the divisional reorganization should be left to the judges in each circuit and we
should expect regional variations. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit judges responded to the draft report of the Commission by suggesting changes in
the earlier draft statute. But the Commissioners resisted this overture
and went on to describe in some detail how they imagined their divisional organization could work in the Ninth Circuit. Their Ninth Circuit
blueprint illustrates how reorganization into regional divisions might
7
work in the other circuits.
The Ninth Circuit would be divided into three regional divisions.
Each regional division would have exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
from the district courts within its region. A regional division would
function as a semi-autonomous appellate court sitting in panels. A
panel decision in one regional division would not be binding in another
regional division. Each regional division would have a divisional en
banc to rehear important cases or to reconsider a panel decision that
creates a conflict with another regional division. Existing and still binding Ninth Circuit precedents along with divisional panel decisions could
be overruled only within a division by the divisional en banc procedure.
The Commission further recommended the creation of "Circuit Division for Conflict Resolution" to replace the present Ninth Circuit limited en banc court. The Circuit Division would have discretionary
jurisdiction only to resolve direct conflicts between or among the three
regional divisions.
Thus, the appellate procedural sequence would be an appeal-as-ofright before a three-judge panel of a "regional division," followed by a
petition for rehearing to the "divisional en banc court." If and only if
the decision created a conflict with a decision of another regional division, there could be a discretionary rehearing before the "Circuit Division for Conflict Resolution." Otherwise, the next step would be a
petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.
I agree with the Commission's proposed experiment with regional
divisions in the Ninth Circuit for the recommended eight year period;
7. Appendix C to the final report contains the Commission's proposed statute for the
Ninth Circuit, see http://app.comm.uscourts.gov.
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at the end of the study period, the Federal Judicial Center would report
to the Judicial Conference of the United States which would then recommend to Congress whether the divisional arrangement should be
continued with or without modification. But I disagree with the related
proposal to authorize the other courts of appeals to reorganize themselves into regional divisions. In my opinion, Congress and the Third
Branch should wait and see how this divisional concept plays out in the
Ninth Circuit before generalizing the experiment in the other courts of
appeals and without further compounding the "Hawthorne effect" by
providing for judges in the other circuits to implement their own variations of the concept. Therefore, until some time and study of the Ninth
Circuit proposal have passed, I cannot support such an open-ended and
variable national experiment in all the rest of the regional courts of
appeals.
My endorsement, however, is not without reservation. There was
another experiment in the 1980s with divisions in the old Fifth Circuit
before that circuit was divided into the new Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit. The Fifth Circuit experiment suggests two cautions: first,
the rules of stare decisis behind the concept of the law of the circuit
became so complicated that they nearly defied description; second, the
hindsighted political reality was that the divisional stage of development, implemented by the judges as an administrative experiment, almost immediately precipitated the permanent statutory division of the
circuit by congressional reformers. So my worries are first that the divisional concept will increase the confusion and uncertainty in the law of
the Ninth Circuit and second that it will prematurely accelerate the momentum towards a formal and complete division among judges and
members of Congress.
I am also concerned about the Commission's willingness to reject
the venerable principle of the law of the circuit to the extent that decisions made in one regional division would not bind other divisions.
Variations in the federal law-when the same federal statute or the
same provision of the Constitution is interpreted one way in one circuit
and another way in another circuit-admittedly are a necessary evil of
the current federal appellate geography, but we should be looking for
ways to reduce their frequency and persistence. The Commission's Circuit Division for conflict correction may not be equal to the task. This
proposal would put an end to the limited en banc mechanism, which is
one of the most problematic and ineffective features of the current system, and that would be an improvement. But the Commission's propo-
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sal would create a rather complex and subtle rehearing procedure from
panel decisions. Panels in one division would not be bound by prior
panel decisions in another division but their decision to create a conflict
would be reviewable by the Circuit Division for conflict resolution. At
the same time, each division would continue to rehear en banc panel
decisions it deemed important or mistaken. I am not as sanguine as the
Commission that these nuanced distinctions are easily made and readily
distinguishable. But on balance, these are relatively small concerns.
B.

Two Judge Panels

In a very troubling departure from our federal appellate tradition,
the Commission recommended that Congress authorize the courts of
appeals to sit in two-judge panels, at least in some cases. The expectation is that two-judge panels could decide those appeals clearly controlled by well-settled precedent that presently are being decided
summarily without oral argument. Only if the two judges disagreed or
if they determined that there would be some advantage would they
bring in a third judge.8
This is an unworthy idea. It takes away significantly from the quality of appellate decisionmaking with little promised gain. The threejudge panel long has been the federal tradition and the American norm
for appellate review. Admittedly, the quorum rule of two has been on
the books a long time and works an expedient justice in exceptional
cases when a panel member cannot complete an appeal, but that always
has been understood as an exception-proving rule of necessity. 9
One less perspective on the appeal-as-of-right might diminish the
quality of the particular decision and might reduce the overall quality
of appellate decisionmaking in the run of cases. It might generate some
subtle pressure on the part of the two judges not to disagree so as to
avoid bringing in the third judge. It might increase the untoward influence of staff attorneys and in-chambers law clerks, as a consequence of
the background assumption that the appeal has been screened to be so
straightforward or so unimportant as not to be worthy of much attention even from the two judges. There are many times more combinations of two-judge panels than three-judge panels thus possibly
increasing the hydraulic pressure away from consistency in the law of
the circuit. We cannot know the frequency of one-one splits that would
8.
Appendix C to the final report contains the Commission's draft statute for twojudge panels, see http://app.comm.uscourts.gov.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) (1994).
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require a third judge and thus cancel the promised administrative savings; furthermore, uncertain procedural problems would need to be
overcome to bring in a third judge. This experiment is not likely worth
these risks. The Commission itself understands that the savings in judicial resources would not be a full one-third; the reclaimed judge time
would amount to the time and effort the third judge now spends reading the briefs and conferring with the other two panel members only in
categories of the most marginal appeals. The only saving grace of this
proposal is the sunset provision suggested by the Commission that after
three years the Judicial Conference would decide whether to recommend modifying or eliminating the two-judge panel authority, based on
field studies conducted by the Federal Judicial Center.
C. District Court Appellate Panels
Perhaps the most intriguing idea the Commission developed is the
proposal for District Court Appellate Panels. But I predict it will be
unpopular-probably very unpopular-among judges and lawyers. 10
The Commission proposed that each circuit be authorized to create a "District Court Appellate Panel Service" for an eight year experiment followed by monitoring, reporting, and evaluation. Three-judge
panels would consist of two district judges and one circuit judge. District judges could not participate in appeals from their own district.
The district court appellate panels could hear only appeals in designated categories; the Commission suggested diversity cases and sentencing appeals. After that there would be an appeal to the court of
appeals but only with leave of the court. A district court appellate
panel always could transfer an appeal if it was determined to involve a
significant legal issue.
The cleverness of this idea is that it shifts some of the appellate
workload to the level where more judges already exists-the district
judge level-although the proposal is not based on an assumption that
there presently is an excess supply of district court judge power.
Rather more insightful, the rationale is that creating more district
judgeships at the base of the federal court pyramid would not place
additional strain on the organizational structure and the new judges
would be available to do both appellate work and trial work as needed.
As with its other statutory proposals, the Commission recommends an
10.
Appendix C to the final report contains the Commission's draft statute for District
Court Appellate Panels, see http://app.comm.uscourts.gov.
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eight year experiment, monitored by the Federal Judicial Center, followed by a recommendation from the Judicial Conference to the Congress whether to continue, modify, or eliminate the district court
appellate panel service.
I wholeheartedly endorse this proposed experiment. It is an idea
whose time has come. Court historians will see a family resemblance to
the First Judiciary Act of 1789, which created two different nisi prius
courts: a district court with limited trial jurisdiction and a circuit court
with a combination of original and appellate jurisdiction. The nowrarely-convened three-judge district court and the current bankruptcy
appellate panels are somewhat analogous, as well. More importantly,
present practice suggests this proposal will work: in recent years district
judges have been sitting on three-judge hearing panels in upwards of
twenty percent of the merits appeals in the numbered circuits. The
Commission sounds the right note of caution, however, to call for a
temporary experiment characterized by careful monitoring, reporting,
and evaluation.
V.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

The Commission on Structural Alternatives hedged its bets somewhat on a few other reform issues. The final report recommends
against authorizing direct appeals to the courts of appeals from the
bankruptcy appellate panels until the completion of an on-going study
being conducted by the Judicial Conference Committee on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System. The Commission also considered,
without making any actual recommendation, the idea of making the
jurisdiction of the courts of appeals discretionary, in at least some cases,
and the final report merely mentions the possibility of adding to the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.
A.

Bankruptcy Appeals

During the study period, another Commission-the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission-recommended that appeals of decisions by bankruptcy judges in core matters be heard directly in the regional courts of appeals, instead of the present system that allows those
appeals either to go to a district court or to a bankruptcy appellate
panel.
A bankruptcy appellate panel ("BAP") is comprised of several
bankruptcy judges who decide appeals from bankruptcy courts from
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outside their own court. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 authorized Judicial Councils to create BAPs. Without a BAP, or in a case
when the parties exercise the option, an appeal from a bankruptcy
judge goes to the article III district court. In a circuit with a BAP, so
long as the district judges from that district approve of the procedure,
an appeal from a bankruptcy judge goes to a panel of three bankruptcy
judges from outside the district in which the case was filed. An appeal
from a final judgment of a BAP goes to the court of appeals.
The Commission on Structural Alternatives urged Congress to
await the outcome of the Judicial Conference's comprehensive study
before enacting legislation authorizing direct appeals to the courts of
appeals from bankruptcy courts. The Commission's primary concern
was for adding to the appellate workload (approximately 3,400 more
appeals each year), but the final report suggests there may be other,
better alternatives to direct appeals to the court of appeals.
In 1998, the House of Representatives passed a comprehensive
bankruptcy reform bill that contained an authorization for direct appeals to the courts of appeals from bankruptcy courts. It will be interesting to watch how Congress ultimately chooses between the opposing
recommendations of these two congressionally-created commissions.
B.

General Discretionary Review

The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts
of Appeals simply was not persuaded that it would be a good idea to
replace the appeal-as-of-right across the board."1
Several judges and commentators have long maintained that this
would be the best solution to the problems of the courts of appeals.
Furthermore, some have insisted that the current reality-screening
panels and decisions without oral argument and without published
opinions-amounts to a system of de facto discretionary appeals. They
argue that the judges are affording more important appeals more careful attention and the less important appeals get only an affirming nod.
But the Commission was not ready to recommend this idea, at least not
now, although this part of the final report reads more like a "maybe
someday"-maybe some day, but not today.
The Commission's discussion of discretionary review is illuminating, however, and the final report serves to advance the debate on this
subject. By distinguishing between the Supreme Court's certiorari au11.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
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thority and what the final report labels the "Virginia type" of discretionary review, the Commission has contributed an important
clarification and focus that will help inform future discussion.
Everyone is familiar, of course, with the Supreme Court variety of
discretionary jurisdiction by way of the writ of certiorari. The Justices
have an unfettered discretion to take a case or to refuse to take a case
on petition and a refusal has no precedential effect. By contrast, the
Virginia variety-which has English roots and which is found in Virginia and West Virginia state court systems and in the federal system in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Services-involves
discretion of a different kind: the appellate determination to grant or
deny leave to appeal contemplates an examination of the merits and a
denial means that the appeal does not present an issue of reversible
error.
I second the Commission's rejection of a Supreme Court-like certiorari authority for the courts of appeals. But I respectfully disagree
with the Commission's conclusion to wait-and-see about the Virginia
type of discretionary review. I am of the opinion that the procedural
shortcuts and intramural reforms already implemented by the judges in
the courts of appeals violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the de jure
appeal-as-of-right statute. I submit that it would benefit the federal appellate system to admit to this reality and to formalize and nationalize
appellate procedures.
C.

Federal Circuit

In 1982, Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. It has a nationwide jurisdictional boundary to hear
appeals from certain lower courts and administrative bodies (Court of
Federal Claims; Court of International Trade; Court of Veterans Appeals; Merit System Protection Board) and exclusive appellate jurisdiction for all appeals from all district courts in patent infringement cases.
The Commission did not go so far as recommending legislation.
Instead, this section of the final report merely identified two categories
of cases that Congress might possibly consider adding to the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: tax appeals and social security appeals. My
own sense of these two almost off-hand mentions is that the number of
appeals that would be shifted away from the regional courts of appeals
would not amount to a large reduction in their caseload so other policy
reasons, for example, a desire for greater consistency in outcomes or
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streamlining administrative procedures, should be the motivation for
pursuing legislation.
VI.

WHAT WILL THE FUTURE BRING?

The final report represents the best thinking of a talented and experienced and dedicated group of Commissioners and staff, informed
by broad study and developed with an eye towards judicial and congressional politics. It serves to defend judicial independence. It moves
the debate far away from the infinite regress of past congresses to add
judgeships and to split circuits without a grand design. It analyzes and
guides a conscientious member of Congress through the thirty-plus year
debate over the Ninth Circuit. It broadens its scope to include all the
courts of appeals and their future. It focuses the seemingly endless academic discussion of proposed reforms by drafting implementing statutes that will be introduced as bills in anticipation of hearings and,
perhaps eventually, the passage of legislation. It advances the debate
over the future of the federal courts on several critical subjects.
All this was accomplished with small numbers and in a short time
and the members of the Commission and their staff deserve our kudos.
But one more report-even one more excellent report-is not the goal
of those of us concerned with the future of the federal courts. What
will that future bring?
Based on the past, we can be confident that the future will bring
two things: more appeals and more judges. Indeed, every study and
commission and committee that has studied the courts of appeals has
predicted that the future will bring continued appellate docket growth
and its attendant problems will continue to worsen, although no one
seems to know for sure why or even how much to expect.
At the beginning of this decade, the predecessor group to the present Commission, the Federal Courts Study Committee, observed:
"However people may view other aspects of the federal judiciary, few
deny that its appellate courts are in a 'crisis of volume' that has transformed them from the institutions they were even a generation ago." 1 2
That Study Committee confidently predicted that "[f]urther and more
fundamental change to the appellate courts would seem to be inevita-i3
ble ....
12.

Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee Report 109 (1990), reprinted in, 22

CONN. L. REv. 733, 847 (1990).
13.
Id.
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The Constitution tasks Congress with the authority and the responsibility to design a new federal court structure for the twenty-first
century. The 106th Congress seems poised to address the problems of
the Ninth Circuit. That legislative moment may well include some of
the ideas suggested by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for
the Federal Courts of Appeals. Those ideas have the potential for
reconfiguring the organization and procedures of all the other courts of
appeals for better or for worse. Court watchers will be watching Con4
gress for a change1

14.

For a selective bibliography of some of Professor Baker's related writings, see

Thomas Baker, Two Cheers for the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal

Courts of Appeals, 1999
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1, http://www.fclr.org/1999fedctslrevl.htm.

